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Rethinking Labour Market Institutions in Indian Industry: Forms, 
Functions and Socio-historical Contexts*  
Satoshi Miyamura† 
Department of Economics, SOAS, University of London, UK 
Abstract 
The emerging literature on institutional functionalism opens opportunities for 
historically- and socially-sensitive analysis of institutions, especially if it is 
complemented by a material understanding of institutions and their location within the 
wider social structure. This paper engages constructively with the ‘credibility’ thesis 
in institutional economics by developing an alternative materialist conception of 
labour market institutions (LMIs) and applies it to the debates on the Indian industry. 
Empirical observations collected from field research in various industrial sites in India 
show that changes to institutional forms have almost always involved labour unrest 
and conflict, but not always in accordance to the alleged form-function relations.  The 
credibility thesis opens a way for debates on LMIs to move away from the central 
focus on their forms by evaluating the extent to which institutions are contested 
within specific socio-historical contexts. Also, the alternative conception suggests that 
labour, capital and the state may have perspectives on functions of LMIs that may not 
always coincide, which relate to different types of development. This is of particular 
interest in the context of India where the on-going policy debates on labour market 
reforms have primarily focused on ‘form’ variables. The implication is that the 
ongoing debates in India focusing on policies that attempt to engineer changes to 
forms of LMIs may be misguided and ineffective. 
Keywords: word; institutional functions; labour market institutions; labour-
management relations; trade unions; collective bargaining; India 
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Rethinking Labour Market Institutions in Indian Industry: Forms, 
Functions and Socio-historical Contexts  
Introduction 
Amendments to labour laws and modifications of trade unionism have been central to 
the debates on labour market reforms in India over the past three decades. There is a 
general recognition that the prevailing forms of these institutions need to be 
transformed, albeit with disparate opinions on the direction and content of such reforms. 
Proponents of labour market flexibility have argued for the removal or weakening of 
employment protection laws, decentralisation of collective bargaining institutions and 
reducing the roles played by political parties and external agents, including the state, in 
mediating industrial relations (for example, see GoI 2002; for further discussion, see 
Miyamura 2012). Despite the protestation by trade unions, civil society organisations 
and academics, the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is currently proposing to 
introduce various measures to allow greater number of firms to operate outside the 
coverage of many labour legislations, and to make it more difficult for trade unions to 
be formed and recognised as representative agents (Deakin and Haldar 2015; Lerche 
2015).  
In addition to the standard arguments in favour of flexible labour markets that focus on 
growth, investment and employment generation, a variant of the Indian debate also 
points to possible effects of these labour market reforms in creating more harmonious 
labour-management relations. For example, Anant (2009: 195-200) has suggested that 
instead of trade unions and the state, ‘there is a need to return to trust-based 
mechanisms’ and ‘social capital’ in improving dispute resolution. The BJP, in its 
election manifesto, declared labour as the ‘pillar of our growth’, and suggested labour 
law reforms as one of the means to promote a ‘harmonious relationship between labour 
and the industry’ and to encourage them to embrace the concept of 'industry family’ 
(BJP 2014: 31). The government’s slogan of ‘Make in India’ necessitates ‘disciplined’ 
labour to be employed smoothly by foreign investors the country is attempting to 
attract.  
This paper questions the premise assumed in these debates that once implemented, 
reformed institutions would perform in a predetermined and desired manner. It does so 
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by engaging constructively with emerging approaches to ‘institutional functionalism’, in 
particular the ‘credibility’ thesis, as expounded in this special issue. As discussed in 
Section 1.1, labour (power) as commodity is distinct in its fundamental indeterminacy, 
and therefore it is of particular interest to evaluate the applicability of this thesis to the 
labour market. This paper is the first explicit attempt to explore the scope of the 
credibility thesis in the context of labour market institutions (LMIs). It also employs 
statistical technique previously unused for LMIs analysis to examine the thesis using 
empirical observations drawn from a long-term fieldwork on labour-management 
relations in Indian manufacturing industry between 2001 and 2014. It is argued that the 
credibility thesis allows the debates on LMIs to move away from the central focus on 
their forms by evaluating the extent to which institutions are contested within specific 
socio-historical contexts. Also, its focus on conflicts and contestations over LMIs 
highlights the importance of evaluating the forms and functions of these institutions in a 
context-sensitive manner, most importantly within the social and historical specificity in 
industrial development and social structure. The latter emphasis is derived from a 
materialist conceptualisation of LMIs as means to regulate the specific social relations 
of production. This alternative approach to LMIs, and the ‘functionalist’ approach more 
generally, are evaluated in light of debates around the nature of development, especially 
Selwyn’s (2014) proposition for a ‘labour-centred development’. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses theoretical 
developments in approaches to LMIs and examines the scope of the credibility thesis as 
a framework for understanding institutional diversity and change in labour markets. The 
meaning of institutions, their forms and functions are re-examined, and an alternative 
materialist conception of LMIs is proposed.  
Section 2 outlines the methodology employed in data collection and discusses contexts 
for the empirical analysis of this paper. This is followed by Section 3, where a 
descriptive statistic technique is used to map out broad formal characteristics of LMIs 
observed in the empirical data.  
The resulting ‘mapping’ of LMIs is interpreted and discussed in Section 4. Section 4.1 
compares patterns of LMIs in ‘traditional sector’ units in Kolkata and Mumbai, while 
Section 4.2 does the same for the ‘modern sector’. Through these observations, the 
scope for the credibility thesis is discussed. Section 4.3 then draws on selected cases of 
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institutional change to discuss factors underlying the diversity and dynamics of LMIs. 
Through the discussion in Section 5 the paper concludes. 
1. Theoretical approaches to labour market institutions (LMIs) 
In this Section, an alternative materialist framework for institutional analysis of labour 
markets is developed. In order to do so, it would be useful to discuss what is meant by 
LMIs and what their forms and functions mean.  
1.1 Rethinking LMIs 
Mainstream economics have tended to conceive institutions as dichotomous to markets: 
thus it refer to a whole range of formal and informal social arrangements from property 
rights and laws to normative rules and customs. The concept of LMIs more or less 
follows from this premise. For example, Saint-Paul (2000, 1) characterises LMIs ‘as a 
set of institutions that restrict the ability of private parties to freely set quantities and 
prices,’ while Nunziata (2003, 6) defines them as ‘the set of rules, regulations, 
enforcement laws and organizational patterns governing the labour market’.  
Note that orthodox neoclassical economics models labour markets as mechanism for 
smooth matching of labour supply and demand, and for the efficient allocation of labour 
services to productive sectors. In this sense, those debating LMIs can already be 
differentiated from this orthodoxy, where there is not room for LMIs. Nevertheless, the 
mainstream conception of LMIs is primarily focused on applying price theories to the 
exchange of labour (power or effort), and evaluate their efficiency or welfare 
implications. Furthermore, LMIs as ‘rules’ that govern labour markets is ahistorical and 
does not specify which socio-economic relations are to be prioritised in examining 
whether or not, and how, markets function differently (Miyamura 2012, 99-102).  
In contrast, this paper proposes an alternative materialist conception of LMIs focused on 
how social relations of production are regulated, and which is sensitive to particular 
historical and social contexts in which labour markets operate. In order to do so, it is 
necessary to start with features of capitalist society as being characterised by conflictual 
social relations, in essence, between capital and wage-labour (Marx 1973: 100-108). Of 
course, in practice class compromise can arise, and indeed, collective bargaining can be 
understood as a negotiation process for profits to be ‘shared’ with labour. Nevertheless, 
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capital-labour relations are necessarily conflictual because the production and 
appropriation of surplus-value is an appropriation of part of the product of the labour of 
others (Croix 1981: 43).  
Also, although capital-labour relations often involve a variety of social and political 
expressions, including ethnicity and gender, the essence of capitalist social relations is 
an ‘economic’ conflict over the realisation of the labour power, due to its fundamental 
indeterminacy (Smith 2006; Thompson and Smith 2009). That is, the extent to which 
labour power is extracted cannot be predetermined prior to the production process, and 
therefore systems of management as well as bargained consent from labour are required. 
In this context, the role of LMIs can be interpreted more explicitly as means to regulate 
the structural conflict in the social relations of production. Note that what a ‘regulation’ 
of the relations means and what mode it takes are to be empirically worked out by 
examining the historically- and socially-specific patterns of capitalist development, as 
shall be discussed for cases in India in Section 4. 
The rest of this paper will focus on collective bargaining institutions, in particular 
procedures for collective bargaining, and formations of trade unionism and other labour 
organisations. These, along with other institutions governing Indian labour markets, 
such as patriarchy and caste, are institutional conditions for extraction of surplus value 
and accumulation to take place, or the social structure of accumulation (Gordon, 
Edwards and Reich 1982; Harriss-White 2003: 119).  
1.2 Postulated form-function relations in LMIs 
Given the mainstream conception, the focus of much of the literature has been on 
identifying the ‘right’ forms of LMIs, which hinder the market mechanism less, and 
promote employment and productivity growth. Also, in many of the existing models, 
institutional functions are assumed to follow immediately from their forms. Thus, 
Freeman (1993) describes the traditional debates on LMIs to have been between the 
‘distortionists’ who claim that the presence of labour laws or trade unions is necessarily 
harmful to efficiency and productivity due to their interference with the functioning of 
labour markets (Agarwala 1983; Fallon and Lucas 1991, Mangel, DeLorme and 
Kamerschen 1994; amongst others) and ‘institutionalists’ associating LMIs with 
potentially value-enhancing effects (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 
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1988; Standing 1992). In particular, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) propose a hump-
shaped model to articulate that highly centralised or highly decentralised bargaining 
structures are less likely to encourage wage militancy by unions compared to 
intermediately centralised ones. Similarly, Pencavel (1995) suggests that trade unions 
affiliated to political parties are more likely to see their bargaining strategies detached 
from ‘dealings with the employers and the workers they represent’ (p. 3).  
In the Indian debate, GoI (2002) has recommended weakening of employment 
protective clauses in legislation and removal of party-links in trade unions organisations 
as means to increase formal employment and raise productivity. Interestingly, 
Teitelbaum (2011) has countered studies such as Besley and Burgess (2004) by arguing 
that employment protective legislation and party-affiliated unionism strengthen the 
ability of the state to manage and ‘restrain’ labour militancy, and thereby can improve 
productivity and employment growth, but nevertheless remaining within the same 
causal logic of linking forms of LMIs to functions. 
1.3 Credibility thesis in LMIs 
There have been recent attempts within institutional economics, including the 
contributions to this special issue, to shift the analytical focus away from the fixation on 
institutional forms to discuss how they function. A variant of this ‘functionalist’ 
approach to institutional theory3 is the ‘credibility’ thesis, which Ho (2014, 16) has 
defined as ‘the perception of endogenously, autonomously shaped institutions as a 
common arrangement’. In highlighting ‘the endogeneity of credibility’, Grabel (2000, 2; 
11) considers roles played by ‘class conflict, and the distribution of income, wealth and 
political power’ in shaping the credibility of policies and institutions. By doing so, this 
approach focuses on what functions existing institutions and property rights fulfil as a 
way to explain their emergence and persistence. 
In the context of LMIs, the research agenda proposed by the credibility thesis focuses 
the analysis and debates on the varied and dynamic ways in which prevailing collective 
                                                
3 Note that the ‘functionalist’ approach discussed here are to be differentiated from self-
equilibrating systemic model of functionalism in sociology. 
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bargaining arrangements and labour organisations are supported or contested by 
bargaining agents, and how these conflicts are managed at a given time and space (Ho 
2014: 18). Thus, instead of the distortionist-intitutionalist debate on whether 
unionisation is harmful or conducive for the functioning of labour markets, the present 
research will examine conditions under which trade unions of various types and other 
labour organisations persist or are overthrown. It will not take for granted that collective 
bargaining at industry-level or party-affiliation of unions encourage or restrain labour 
militancy, but rather appraise circumstances under which they do so. Thereby the 
credibility thesis contends that institutional analysis should refrain from passing moral, 
theoretical and political judgements on institutional forms. 
At the same time, moral and political perspectives are important in evaluating functions 
of LMIs. Given the alternative conception of LMIs in Section 1.1 as means to regulate 
the social relations of production, functions of LMIs differ depending on who’s 
perspective on which institutional functions are to be evaluated. Firstly, given the 
conflictual nature of their relations, functions of LMIs are different for capital and 
labour. For capital, the function of LMIs as part of social structures of accumulation is 
to create and maintain stable conditions for the labour-power employed to be fully 
utilised in the production process. But this necessarily implies subjugation, however 
subtle or consented, by capital of labour, who in turn may resist extraction of labour 
power by demanding greater share of profits, shortening of the working day, or curbing 
the intensification of the labour process. Secondly, capital and labour may not 
respectively be a single agent in practice. Those in managerial classes may have 
different interests to be mobilised through LMIs depending on their role in the 
organisation. Similarly, interests of trade union officials may not fully coincide with 
rank-and-file workers, and moreover unionists at different levels of the organisation 
may also have different interests (Bhowmik 2006: 93). Finally in a capitalist society, 
capital-labour relations interact and are articulated with the state in complex ways, with 
competing interests differentiated and alliances forged in a temporary and spatially-
specific ways (Bensaϊd 2002: 111-2).  
Thus, in order to understand the diversity and dynamics of LMIs, it becomes important 
to specify for whom the function of institutions are accepted or contested. This is a 
question unaddressed in the mainstream ahistorical conception of LMIs, but one that 
can be opened up through the credibility thesis. It is important to also note that the 
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importance of moral and political perspectives reflects different conception of 
development. In mainstream development economics, labour is treated as commodity 
input for growth and economic transition. On the face of it, capital’s perspective on the 
function of LMIs as regulating labour relations to maintain conditions for production to 
take place appear to be consistent with this conventional idea of economic development, 
even if the process gives rise to present and future benefits for workers, or is ‘shared’ or 
‘inclusive’. However, as shall be discussed in some of the cases in Section 4, most 
prominently in Kolkata jute textile industry, there may be a difference between the 
perspective of individual capital, or even a collective perspective of capital in a 
particular sector, and the perspective of capitalist development at a macro-level.  
In contrast to the conventional conception of development, Selwyn (2014: 44) proposes 
‘labour-centred development’, where ‘labouring classes and their struggles against 
exploitation by capital are politically prioritized, and are conceptualized as 
“developmental” because they can deliver improvements to workers’ (and their 
families’ and communities’) livelihoods’. In other words, labour’s perspective on the 
function of LMIs as means to gain greater control over the labour process and to 
mobilise labour’s interest is consistent with this ‘labour-centred’ conception of 
development. But once again in practice, labour mobilisation leading to gains for 
workers in a section of an economy does not necessarily immediately imply all-
encompassing mobilisation or improvements in conditions for the working class as a 
whole (Pattenden 2016). As Lebowitz (2003) suggests, labour’s struggle for its own 
development can coincide with capitalist development, but this is process is not 
automatic and often uneven (Das 2012). Thus, if LMIs are to be evaluated for their 
developmental implications, it matters which benchmark for development is to be 
prioritised, and this issue will be revisited in the Conclusion of this paper. 
2. Fieldwork data and context 
The empirical analysis of labour-management relations in this paper is based on 
fieldwork in various regions of India in 2001 and 2013-14. This period coincided with a 
phase of rapid economic growth, with the GDP growth rates averaging 8.9 percent 
between 2003-04 and 2007-08, and manufacturing growth rates averaging ten percent 
during the same period. The impact of 2008 global financial crisis has led to a so far 
unstable economic growth pattern in India, with GDP growth rates fluctuating between 
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4.5 and 8.9 percent over the past six years. The 2003-08 economic boom was driven by 
export growth particularly in the manufacturing, and the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sectors (Mohanty 2013; Nagaraj 2008; 2014), and accompanied moderate employment 
growth in the formal manufacturing sector averaging 7.5 percent per annum (Goldar 
2011; Nagaraj 2011). It is worth noting that employment in the formal or ‘organised’ 
sector4 in India has accounted for less than 10 percent of the total working population 
(Harriss-White 2003, 5). However, there has been intensification in the continued trend 
of ‘nesting of the informal within the formal’ with an increasing proportion of 
employment characterised by ‘temporary contracts or casual arrangements and lacking 
social security provisions’ (Samaddar 2009, 34). 
More disaggregated analyses indicate that the past decade has also been a period of 
structural change in India’s organised manufacturing employment, with employment 
shifting away from historically traditional industrial centres such as Mumbai (Bombay) 
in Maharashtra and Kolkata (Calcutta) in West Bengal. Instead, over recent decades 
employment growth has been observed in cities and towns adjoining larger 
metropolises, in rural areas, as well as in other newer industrial centres of India, such 
as: Gujarat, which neighbours Maharashtra; Tamil Nadu in south India; the National 
Capital Region (NCR) in north India; and further north in Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttarakhand; amongst others (Goldar 2011; Chandresekhar and Sharma 2014). This 
structural change in employment patterns can be seen as a consequence of shifts in 
industrial locations (Pandey and Shetty 2014), on the one hand, and the changing flows 
of labour migration patterns (Kundu and Saraswati 2012), on the other, which saw 
declines in concentration of factory and labour migration in-flows to cities such as 
Mumbai and Kolkata5.  
The empirical analysis provided in this paper is intended to capture some important 
aspects of the regional and sectoral diversity in changes to LMIs in the context of 
                                                
4 In India, the organised sector is defined in terms of industrial sector classifications, the size of 
the establishment, and usage of power. See Miyamura (2010) for details. 
5 As suggested by Silver (2014) amongst others, the observed industrial restructuring is also part 
of broader processes of the relocation of manufacturing under global capitalism. 
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industrial restructuring in India. For this purpose, two rounds of fieldwork, the first in 
2001 and the second in 2013-14, have been carried out, with samples chosen from 
regional and sectoral ‘strata’ outlined in Table 1. 
(Table 1) 
As LMIs are conceptualised as regulating social relations of production, it is important 
that our analysis of their forms and functions take into account of differences in 
technological and organisational conditions. For this purpose, fieldwork has been 
carried out in a number of mills and factories in a wide variety of different types of 
industrial activities, which might be categorised as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ industries. 
Jute textile manufacturing in Kolkata and cotton textile manufacturing in Mumbai are 
represented by the ‘traditional’ sector, both industries with historical roots in the 1850s. 
Conventional mills in this sector are characterised by labour-intensive nature of 
production and relatively small changes in the technology used, although there are a 
small number of ‘progressive’ mills that have adopted newer labour-replacing 
technology in recent decades as discussed in Section 4.1. In contrast, the ‘modern’ 
sector includes a wider range of different types of manufacturing firms, which are 
relatively new, although some were established as early as the 1920s and ’30s. The 
production technology in the ‘modern’ sector units is more capital-intensive, and many 
of the production processes require much higher levels of technology and skills than in 
jute and cotton textile manufacturing. Although none of these factories is operating at 
the global technological production frontier, the discussion in Section 4 shows diverse 
trajectory of technological changes in Indian industries. While some production units 
surveyed in this research saw technological upgrading and improvements in labour 
productivity, others such as the Kolkata jute textile sector have seen limited changes to 
production technology and organisation. Diversity and dynamics of institutional 
arrangements in regulating labour regulations will be interpreted in the context of this 
uneven development.  
In addition to the differences in technological and organisational conditions, the 
capacity for different sections of capital, labour and the state to reshape the regulation 
over relations of production also depends on the historical context of industrial 
development and the particular ways in which labour management has been 
institutionalised within the broader political economy. The two main sites of the 
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fieldwork have been Kolkata and Mumbai6, which were amongst the oldest industrial 
centres of India dating from the colonial period (Sinha 2006; Roy 2013), and also have 
been amongst the focal points of organised labour movement at least since the late 19th 
century. However, their industrial performances diverged from the late 1970s, with 
Mumbai associated with more rapid industrial development, while Kolkata has 
generally been characterised by relative stagnation (Baddeley et al. 2006; Miyamura 
2010; Roy 2013). As discussed above, both cities have experienced industrial 
restructuring in recent decades, characterised by closure of factories and shifts of 
production to other regions where large-scale industrialisation and organised labour 
movements are historically less established, and the local state is less attentive in 
applying labour laws. These contextual specificities will be invoked in discussing the 
emerging patterns of LMIs in Section 4. 
The above dynamics of industrial restructuring is reflected in the 13 year gap between 
the two fieldwork rounds, whereby many of the units surveyed in 2001 terminated and 
relocated production either to other cities or rural areas within the State, or to other parts 
of India. Deindustrialisation was particularly severe in Mumbai, reflected in only one 
out of 11 units surveyed in 2001 still operating in 2014. While attempts were made to 
resurvey units that remained open for production, for those that relocated the survey 
was conducted at the new unit where feasible. This meant that the fieldwork sites 
extended beyond the two cities from 2001, as mapped in Figure 1. They included 
various urban and rural areas within Maharashtra as well as the neighbouring State of 
Gujarat, and industrial areas in the Delhi-NCR (National Capital Region), Haryana and 
Himachal Pradesh. Several additional units7 were also surveyed in Kolkata and Mumbai 
in order to further deepen the understanding of the process of industrial restructuring 
and relocation. Overall, information from a total of 35 units was obtained. 
                                                
6 Strictly speaking the fieldwork extended to units located in neighbouring districts beyond the 
administrative boundary of both cities, such as Howrah in West Bengal and Navi-Mumbai 
in Maharashtra. However, for simplification we shall use Kolkata and Mumbai to refer to 
industrial sites in the greater metropolitan area in and around the two cities. 
7 In units that were studied during the 2014 fieldwork, but not in 2001, information on LMIs 
around 2001 was obtained through interviews with managers and union leaders, where 
possible. 
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(Figure 1) 
Sample selection from the four strata was non-probabilistic: access to factory units 
depended heavily on personal contacts and cooperation. The selection can be considered 
‘judgemental’ or ‘purposive’ in that they were based on certain predetermined criteria, 
as outlined in the ‘strata’ in Table 1, ensuring that units with a variety of technological 
and performance-levels, and market status within the sector were included (see also 
Miyamura 2011). Given the lack of information on the relationship between the sample 
and the sampling frame, it is difficult to evaluate the extent of ‘representativeness’ of 
the data, but for the reasons discussed above, it is likely that the sample captures some 
aspects of the diversity and dynamics of labour-management relations in Indian 
industry. The empirical analysis of this paper combines descriptive statistics of the 
fieldwork data with case study approaches, which have allowed for significant empirical 
depth not achievable with available survey data. Although the objective of the case 
studies is to analyse institutional arrangements in labour-management relations in the 
sample, rather than to demonstrate its representativeness, comparison will be made with 
other studies as additional empirical support. 
3. Multivariate analysis of labour market institutions (LMIs) in Indian 
industry 
The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to empirically examine the conceptual and 
theoretical issues outlined in Section 1. To describe the broad patterns in forms of 
LMIs, seven variables are selected. While not exhaustive, these variables are 
conventionally used in the literature to characterise institutional forms of labour-
management relations as discussed in Section 1.2, and are relevant to the particular 
Indian context (for example: Freeman and Medoff 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; 
Banerji, Campos, and Sabot 1995; Teitelbaum 2011; see Miyamura 2010 for further 
discussion). This includes unionisation, levels of bargaining, affiliation of unions to 
external organisations, types of union leaderships, bargaining parties, and ownership 
types of the firm. All seven variables measured by dichotomous variables, and their 
definitions and descriptive statistics are listed in Table 2.  
(Table 2) 
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(Table 3) 
(Figure 2) 
(Table 4) [EDITORIAL NOTE: Figure 2 and Table 4 to be on the same page] 
As a statistical method, multidimensional scaling (MDS) is adopted to reduce the 
number of dimensions in the data matrix and categorise types of LMIs in the surveyed 
units. MDS is an explicitly data exploratory method that does not impose pre-
determined probabilistic models in its procedure, but instead used to  examine broad 
patterns of similarities and differences in the forms of LMIs amongst units surveyed. 
The objective of the MDS is to ‘map’ these units in a reduced multidimensional space, 
so that their relative positions in the space reflect the rank order of proximities between 
these observations (see Dillon and Goldstein 1984). 
Fifty observations (consisting of 35 units, of which for 15 units, data from both 2001 
and 2013-14 fieldwork periods were used) are plotted along two dimensions in Figure 2, 
according to their configuration coordinates obtained from MDS. Observations from the 
two rounds of fieldwork are pooled together, and therefore the MDS process does not 
take into account the two periods. Note that the MDS is merely used to describe the 
broad patterns in forms of LMIs; it is recognised that the time dimension is significant 
in analysing changes of LMIs between the two fieldwork periods, and therefore will be 
an important focus in the interpretation of the MDS mapping when the dynamics of 
LMIs are examined in Section 4. 
The MDS mapping is plotted along two dimensions that explain the highest proportion 
of the total variance (eigenvalues), and which sufficiently capture the general structure 
of the original data. The two dimensions thus retained from the MDS procedure are 
interpreted to characterise two aspects in types of LMIs dominant in the data: (1) the 
extent of centralised or state-mediation in LMIs and (2) the reduction in the extent of 
externalisation of LMIs and unionism. The interpretation of these two dimensions is 
justified on the basis of table 3. Dimension 1 is most strongly correlated with 
CENTRAL, a variable denoting centralised collective bargaining; followed by 
TRIPARTITE, which indicates that bargaining is tri-partite involving the state. 
Dimension 2 has strong negative correlations with: PLANT, suggesting presence of 
localised unit-level bargaining; UNION, which represents unionisation; and INTERNAL, 
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a variable designated for union leadership from within the rank-and-file of the 
workplace. That these two dimensions are found to be the more dominant features of the 
LMIs in India is consistent with the literature (see for example, Rudolph and Rudolph 
1987; Ramaswamy 1988; Bhattacherjee 1999). Note that the figures along the two 
dimensions merely represent the final iterative solution in the MDS procedure and do 
not have an absolute meaning. Our interest in the MDS mapping in Figure 2 is that the 
derived spatial distances between points in the mapping corresponds to the ‘proximities’ 
of values in the original seven variables, and thus allows interpretation of broad 
clustering of institutional forms observed in the surveyed units.  
The MDS procedure resulted in 11 ‘points’ plotted on the mapping, labelled 
alphabetically from A to K, representing different combinations of institutional forms 
measured by the seven variables. Most of these points in the MDS mapping contain 
multiple surveyed units, reflecting that they share the same combination in values of the 
seven variables used in MDS, and in this sense can be interpreted as ‘types’ of LMIs 
categorised in terms of particular formal characteristics. Many of these points also 
broadly correspond to the ‘strata’ in the survey design of the fieldwork as summarised 
in table 1.  
Clustering of units in each stratum that are interpreted to represent the typical LMIs in 
the region and sector are circled by dotted lines, and discussed in the following sub-
sections. The clusters of LMIs types identified8 are for Kolkata traditional; Mumbai 
traditional; Kolkata modern; and Maharashtra/ Gujarat/ NCR modern.  
Forms of LMIs as mapped out in Figure 2 can be useful in highlighting interesting 
findings and raising valuable questions. First, it shows that these broad forms of LMIs 
                                                
8 Point E is included in the cluster of Kolkata modern sector, but with a finer dotted line: this 
represents a public sector jute textile machinery factory that has a different institutional 
form from the other units in the Kolkata modern sector, and instead is closer to those in the 
Kolkata traditional sector. Point F corresponds to a private cotton textile mill in Mumbai 
with a LMIs type deviating from that conventionally established in the Mumbai traditional 
sector, and thus is not included in a cluster. Point K is also not circled into any of the 
cluster: this embodies all units without trade union representation in the factory and thus is 
not specific to any region or sector.  
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are primarily characterised by the two dimensions: the degree of centralisation in 
labour-management relations and the extent of internalisation of bargaining agents. This 
finding is in line with existing studies, such as Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and Aidt 
and Tzannatos (2002), and is also consistent with much of the focus of policy debates in 
India (for example, see GoI 2002). Second, far from the stereotyping of organised and 
unionised labour into a single ‘Indian model’, the diagram also confirms the diversity in 
forms of LMIs in Indian industry. Third, although with some overlaps and exceptions, 
many of the clusters identified seems to correspond to the regional and sectoral clusters 
in the research design outlined in table 1. Fourth, on the basis of the seven variables 
used to characterise forms of LMIs, institutional forms changed dramatically in some 
units, whereas they remained relatively resilient in others. Although this final 
observation is not visible in Figure 2 due to pooling of data, it is discussed in Section 4 
below. 
4. Diversity and dynamics of LMIs in Indian industry 
As discussed in Section 3, form-centred analysis formulated in the MDS mapping in 
Figure 2 allows confirmation that there is broad correspondence between forms of LMIs 
and regional/ sectoral groupings. The challenge for institutional analysis is to explain 
the observed diversity in forms of LMIs, examine how they function, and account for 
their changes. In the course of the discussion, references will be made to individual 
units. To comply with the confidentiality agreements with interviewees, units are 
identified by codes, consisting of the strata and an identity number: KT denotes 
‘Kolkata traditional’; KM signifies ‘Kolkata modern’; MT is ‘Mumbai/ Maharashtra 
traditional’; MM represents ‘Mumbai/ Maharashtra modern’; GT stands for ‘Gujarat 
traditional’; GM corresponds to ‘Gujarat modern’; and NM is for ‘NCR/ north India 
modern’. 
From the viewpoint of the credibility thesis, of particular interest are cases where 
institutional changes were observed, and to examine the extent to which these were 
associated with rising contestation over prevailing LMIs. Amongst the 35 surveyed 
units, 11 units are identified to have had formal changes to their LMIs. Of these, four 
cases are identified to have had changes to their institutional forms at the same unit 
between 2001 and 2013-14, whereas all other cases involved relocation of production. 
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Table 5 summarises the changes to institutional forms and their trajectories in surveyed 
units.  
(Table 5) 
4.1 Diverging trajectory of LMIs in ‘traditional sector’ units in Kolkata and 
Mumbai  
Conventional forms of LMIs in ‘traditional’ sector units are represented in points A-D, 
clustered in close proximity, and differentiated from the LMIs in ‘modern’ sector units 
on MDS mapping in Figure 2 principally by labour-management bargaining being held 
at the industry-level. They are also characterised by the presence of party-affiliated 
unions, external leaders, and explicit state involvement in tri-partite collective 
settlements. The more centralised collective bargaining in the ‘traditional’ sector can be, 
at least in part, explained by the more standardised and labour-intensive but less skill-
demanding production technology, in that wages and job classifications for equivalent 
tasks are easier to be harmonised across the sector. That this settlement is mediated by 
the state and political parties implies an acceptance of LMIs by labour, capital and the 
state in proving stable conditions for production to continue in return of securing 
minimum standard of wages and protecting employment and other fringe benefits.  
Kolkata jute textile represents a sector where fragmented party-affiliated unionism and 
state moderated industrial relations have so far been the most resilient amongst the cases 
researched (see also Sen 1992). There has been no change in the number of mills and 
very little advancement of technology used over the past 15 years since the initial 
research (Miyamura forthcoming). All surveyed mills are covered by the industry-wide 
settlement negotiated by the employer association and up to 18 trade union 
organisations, divided along political party and factional lines. This feature has not 
changed since at least the 1970s, although some mills have introduced separate mill-
level settlements over the past 20 years. Part of reasons for the relative stability of LMIs 
in Kolkata jute textile industry can be sought in the context of the sector. Since the 
partition of Bengal in 1947, these mills have been under competitive pressure, first from 
Bangladesh’s jute manufacturing sector, and later from polythene alternatives. This has 
been countered with a central government act that compels the Indian government to 
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procure raw jute, distribute these to mills and use jute bags produced in the public 
distribution of agricultural goods, at fixed prices at both ends.  
In contrast, all cotton textile mills surveyed in 2001, apart from one, have closed down 
in Mumbai by 2014. The one remaining in our sample (MT1) is amongst the three still 
in effective operation in the city, whereas there were 54 cotton textile mills in 1996. The 
cotton textile industry has faced competition from the handloom and powerloom 
sectors, as well as from imported goods since the 1970s. However, in contrast to the 
Kolkata jute, this led to an uneven technological adoption with a small number of 
private ‘progressive’ mills investing in new machinery and diversifying products for the 
domestic middle class market and exports, increasing gaps in productivity and 
profitability with the rest of the so-called ‘backward’ mills with obsolete technology 
(Bhattacherjee 1989). On the labour side, since independence textile mill workers were 
represented by Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), a union affiliated to the 
Congress party, which has been dominating the State of Maharashtra, where Mumbai is 
located. However, the increasing dissatisfaction with the party-affiliated union and the 
state-mediated industry-level collective settlements led to workers bring in a non-party-
affiliated union in an attempt to oust the RMMS, and triggered the Bombay textile strike 
of 1982-83. On the capital side, the uneven development led to a widening of division 
amongst mill owners in the employers’ association, eventually leading to the collapse of 
the prevailing LMIs and eventual discontinuation of the industry-wide pay negotiations 
after 1992 (Kulkarni 1999).  
MT4 and MT5 represent two privately-owned cotton textile mills in Mumbai, which 
broke away from the industry-wide collective bargaining, and conventional forms of 
LMIs associated with the cluster A-D in Figure 2, in the mid-1980s. The departure from 
the industry-wide bargaining and localisation of the labour-management relations are 
reflected in the shift of their forms of LMIs to the left in the MDS mapping, but 
differentiated by the affiliation (F) or otherwise (I) to political party of the unions 
representing their workers. MT4 represents one of the ‘backward’ mills, where the 
owner gradually diversified mill lands for profitable real estate investments, given the 
location in the commercial centre of the city. Although the RMMS continued to act as 
the sole recognised union by the mill owner, workers at this mill were represented by a 
civil society organisation-like union, the Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (GKSS), 
which was formed in 1996 to struggle for rehabilitation of workers who lost their 
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livelihood as a result of closures. While both mills eventually closed down in Mumbai, 
the more profitable ‘progressive’ textile unit, MT5, had its production shifted to new 
composite mills located near Vadodara in Gujarat, GT1, currently operating using the 
‘state-of-the-art’ technology and with non-unionised workers, as indicated by the 
upward shift to non-unionised LMIs type K.  
The comparison of the two sectors implies the potential role played by technology in 
institutional change. Whereas the prevailing LMIs have persisted in Kolkata jute textile 
mills where technological change has been limited, the uneven introduction of new 
technology in the Mumbai cotton textile industry saw institutional change and eventual 
collapse. But it could also be argued that the technological change was a reflection of 
both capital and labour’s contestation over and the loss of ‘credibility’ of the LMIs. 
Significantly, the trajectory of institutional change has been diverse despite all these 
units having similar LMIs two decades ago, represented in the cluster A-D in Figure 2. 
This supports the credibility thesis’ caution against presuming a theoretically 
predetermined form-function relations, and also the postulation that the institutional 
credibility is associated with the level of conflict (Ho 2014: 23).  
Evaluating functions of LMIs reveals potentially conflicting perspectives. The stability 
in the form of LMIs in Kolkata jute may imply those representing the interests of 
labour, capital and the state in the sector have so far been accepting the prevailing 
institutional arrangements, but the outcome may not be ‘developmental’ either from 
labour’s or capital’s viewpoint. Indeed, technology and product diversification that can 
potentially overcome the stagnating condition of the jute textile sector are available, and 
there are indications that certain sections of labour, capital and the state recognise the 
need for institutional change (Miyamura forthcoming). Similarly, although the industrial 
conflict and the eventual breakdown of LMIs were associated with some flourishing of 
alternative forms of labour organisations, it also led to the loss of employment and 
livelihood for a large section of mill workers in the Mumbai textile industry. From 
capital’s perspective, a small number of mills have upgraded their technology and 
increased labour productivity, although this accompanied increased casualisation of the 
labour force, the majority of whom have no access to institutionalised forms of dispute 
resolutions. The rest of the cotton textile mills in Mumbai have closed down, with their 
production shifting to the informal sector. Mill lands have been diverted to real estate 
investments, which may have profited the individual owners but once again raises 
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question as to whether the result has been ‘developmental’, certainly from labour’s or 
society’s viewpoints, but also from the perspective of the capitalist class as a whole. 
4.2 Comparison of LMIs in the modern sector in Kolkata and Mumbai 
Despite the heterogeneity of products and business activities amongst units included in 
the ‘modern’ sector category, all but one unit9 based in Kolkata are represented by 
points G and H, clustered in close proximity around the bottom of the mapping in 
Figure 2, reflecting similarity in institutional forms as measured by the seven variables 
used for the MDS. As shown in Table 4, all units mentioned above are characterised by 
plant-level bargaining; presence of party-politically affiliated unions, but organised and 
led internally at the unit; and being in the private sector. The two points are 
differentiated by whether the bargaining involves the state as an explicit mediator (G) or 
not (H).  
The decentralised form of collective bargaining common to all these ‘modern’ sector 
units can be understood as reflecting the greater variation in economic conditions, 
which makes levelling of compensation structure and working conditions by centralised 
industry-level settlements typical in the conventional institutional forms of the 
‘traditional’ sector (A-D) difficult to sustain. Interestingly, all Kolkata ‘modern’ units 
represented by points G and H had party-political trade unions representing workers. 
Kolkata has seen a dominance of party-affiliated unions, especially the Centre of Trade 
Unions (CITU) affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), which 
was in power in its State of West Bengal between 1977 and 2011. However, the party-
political form of unionism should not be associated with the ideological position of the 
party, which in any case have moved away from the initial stance of revolutionary 
communism soon after taking power (Ramaswamy 1988; Kohli 1990). When the 
CPI(M) was replaced by the All India Trinamool Congress (TMC), it too has 
subsequently attempted to reproduce a similar party-union nexus since 2011 (see 
Miyamura forthcoming). That the party-political form of LMIs continue to dominate in 
these units, despite TMC’s frequent criticism of CPI(M)’s style of trade union politics, 
indicate structural roots in the party political forms of LMIs in Kolkata.  
                                                
9 KM6 in 2001, prior to privatisation; see below. 
 
21 
Compared to the more closely clustered G-H, representing types of LMIs of ‘modern’ 
sector unionised private firms in Kolkata, LMIs of corresponding firms in Mumbai 
appear to show greater diversity in their institutional forms. In the MDS mapping 
presented in Figure 2, unionised ‘modern’ sector units based in Mumbai/ Maharashtra 
are represented by three types of LMIs: H, I and J, all of which are privately-owned 
companies characterised by bi-partite, plant-level bargaining, as summarised in Table 4. 
The distinctions lie in the type of unions and union leadership. Type H, which also 
included a number of Kolkata-based units, is characterised by party-political unions but 
with internal leaders. In contrast, units categorised as type I have so-called 
‘independent’ unions that are not affiliated to political parties, but have union leadership 
linked to external organisations; whereas in type J units the unions are run by internal 
leaders free from any external links.  
In addition to their diversity, what also distinguishes forms of LMIs in these units from 
their counterparts in Kolkata is the relative fluidity in which institutional forms appear 
to have changed between and within different LMIs types. For example, MM4, a 
pharmaceutical plant located in Mumbai, had union-affiliation shifting from the 
Socialist Party (point F); a non-party political external leader (point I); and to the Trade 
Union Centre of India (TUCI) under the influence of the ‘ultra-left’ Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-Leninist) (point H).  
The more diverse and fluid institutional forms in Mumbai’s ‘modern’ sector compared 
to its Kolkata counterparts is difficult to explain on the basis of technology alone, given 
that the ‘modern sector’ in both cities includes a mix of comparable production units. 
While the stability of prevailing LMIs in Kolkata jute textile aforementioned in Section 
4.1 may partly be attributed to regulations, none of the units in the modern sector 
discussed here receives similar level of government protection. That party-affiliated 
unionism dominates and continues to be relatively stable in Kolkata despite 
decentralised bargaining structure once again implies the continued relative importance 
of organised labour for political mobilisation in West Bengal. In contrast, Maharashtra, 
where Mumbai is located, is one of regions in which the Congress party has dominated 
the State politics, apart from being ousted from power in 1995-99, and recently in 
October 2014. Like the CPI(M) in Kolkata, the Congress has also attempted to 
incorporate organised labour through its trade union wing, and in sectors such as textile, 
has imposed it as the sole representative union, as discussed in Section 4.1. However in 
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Maharashtra, the importance of organised labour in regional politics diminished and 
while party-affiliated unions continue to exist, Mumbai became the centre of the so-
called new trade union movement since the 1960s with independent unionists 
increasingly gaining influence (Bhattacherjee 1998; Hensman 2011). The dynamics of 
LMIs, especially in relation to the type of union leadership and their affiliation, appears 
to reflect the capacity of rank-and-file workers to contest prevailing institutions, 
although this is not simply by party-affiliated unions being replaced by independent or 
internal leaders in Mumbai. While in some cases party-affiliation was abandoned in 
favour of independent or internal leaders, in others Mumbai workers have strengthened 
external ties and in some cases even ousted internal leaders. To examine this, further 
trajectories of changes to institutional forms are discussed next. 
4.3 Dynamics of LMIs 
This sub-section draws on selected cases of institutional change to discuss factors 
underlying their trajectories. Significantly apart from one case, changes in forms of 
LMIs involved exacerbation of labour-management conflict. The only exception to this 
is KM6, a Kolkata-based engineering plant manufacturing jute textile machinery, 
which, at the time of study during the 2001 fieldwork was in public hands, with the 
West Bengal State Labour Minister and the Chief Minister mediating in labour-
management settlements. Privatisation of this unit is reflected in the shift of KM6 from 
points E to G in Figure 2, although the state still retains an ‘advisory’ role in collective 
bargaining.  
Of the observed cases of institutional change, KM10, a plant manufacturing water 
dispenser originally in Kolkata, and two units, NM1 and NM2, located in the industrial 
area in the national capital region (NCR) around Delhi and belonging to separate 
passenger transport vehicle companies both with foreign direct investment, have seen 
formation of trade unions between the fieldwork periods. This is reflected in KM10 and 
NM1 shifting from K to H, and NM2 to J, the difference being that the union is 
affiliated to a labour-wing of a political party in the former two units, while the latter is 
unaffiliated to any external organisation. These cases run against the popular perception 
of diminished roles of trade unionism under neoliberal globalisation, and also are of 
importance in the context of India’s on-going policy debate. 
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Apart from these four cases, there are also several cases where formal changes to LMIs, 
as measure by the seven variables used in MDS, had taken place prior to the initial 
fieldwork of 2001, including at MT4, MT5 and (the aforementioned) MM4. There are 
also certain changes to institutional forms that were not captured by the variables 
adopted: for example, many units in Mumbai had seen trade unions shifting their 
affiliation from one political party to another. However, the majority of formal changes 
to LMIs in surveyed units accompanied closure of units and relocation of production.  
The abovementioned union formation in KM10, the water dispenser manufacturing 
plant, resulted from concerns amongst workers that the management was planning to 
shift its production away from Kolkata, affiliating themselves to CITU in order to gain 
support from CPI(M), which was still in power. Two years after unionisation, and a 
CPI(M) brokered voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) and retrenchment settlement, the 
company shifted production to NM4, located in the north Indian region of Chandigarh 
and operates without a union, reflected in a shift to point K. 
While in the above cases production shift accompanied de-unionisation, this was not 
always the case. KM5 and MM3 were light bulb and lamp factories with more or less 
the same production technology and organisation, and managed by the same 
multinational company, but were operating in Kolkata and Mumbai respectively. While 
KM5 had a CITU-affiliated union (represented by point G), MM3 had a plant-based 
union (point J), both of which were linked under the umbrella of a India-wide company 
federation of unions set up in 1971, but which eventually collapsed in 1986. The 
company closed both units in the mid-2000s, shifting their production to GM1 near 
Vadodara in Gujarat, initially operating without unions (K). Several attempts to 
organise workers at the new site GM1 resulted in activists being retrenched, with the 
management instigating a ‘workers’ committee’, which activists allege was ‘psudo-
management’. In 2012, the management recognised setting up of an independent plant-
based union (J), but based on members of the workers’ committee, prompting some 
criticism as a ‘management’s union’, although the union leaders are keen to disassociate 
themselves from this image. 
In other cases where unionisation was maintained in the relocated unit, capacity to build 
solidarity and linkages with extra-plant organisations and movements was significant. 
MM6, a Mumbai-based assembly plant run by an Indian automobile company was 
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closed in the early 2000s, with its production shifted to MM10, near Pune, Maharashtra. 
MM6 had two unions, both party-unaffiliated (categorised as point I), which followed 
the company to MM10. An industrial dispute unfolded when another Pune-based 
external union joined and the management attempted to eject unions from the previous 
plant. In 2010, the three unions merged to form an internal union led by rank-and-file 
workers, with the support of an independent federation of unions in the region, thus 
shifting LMIs to point J.  
Similarly, MM5, a Mumbai plant belonging to a multinational consumer goods 
company closed down in 2004, with its soap manufacturing shifting to MM8, located in 
Khamgaon in north east Maharashtra, and the detergent production shifting to MM9 in a 
central-government controlled Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, bordering 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. Before the closure, workers at the old Mumbai plant MM5 
was represented by a union, which also continues to act as a headquarter of a federation 
to build solidarity and resources for unions under the company. Both of the new sites, 
MM8 and MM9, have internal unions with links to the company’s union federation, 
although with difference in party-political affiliation.  
The above comparisons of LMIs and their changes illustrate that institutional change 
occurred in the context of conflictual industrial relations in which capital and labour 
(sometimes with state involvement) contested the prevailing institutional arrangements 
for workplace regulation. Once again, this supports the thesis of associating institutional 
credibility with contestations.  
The trajectories and outcomes of these changes appear also to be associated with the 
different capacity of workers to mobilise collective action of their own, whether to 
defend their livelihoods or to build solidarity beyond their narrow economic interests. 
For example, unionisation in the multinational transport vehicle companies in the NCR, 
NM1 and NM2, was achieved through workers’ mobilisation over several years, facing 
attempts by the management and the State government to undermine their formation, 
and involving a number of high profile confrontations that resulted in violence. Unions 
at these multinational transport vehicle companies appear to at least attempt to mobilise 
struggles on issues beyond the narrow interests of their members, for example, by 
supporting strike action by contract workers demanding wage equalisation to permanent 
workers, or taking solidarity action with unions in disputes at other factories in the 
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region. Similarly, workers at the automobile plant in Pune, MM10, were able to 
consolidate its labour organisation with the support of regional union federation.  
In this context, a comparison of two cases of India-wide company federation is 
particularly of interest. The management strategy to undermine extra-factory union 
federations, combined with closures of their organising hubs, resulted in the collapse of 
the federation and narrowing of union strategies to unit-level gains in the light bulb and 
lamp factories (MM3/ KM5/ GM1), whereas in the soap and detergent company (MM5/ 
MM8/ MM9), the federation has not only been retained, but strengthened even after the 
relocation of production. The latter company union federation in the multinational soap 
and detergent company cultivated access to international organisations and diplomatic 
communities, and linked its struggle to global solidarity movements as means to 
strengthen their capacity to contest LMIs. However, far from a transition from a 
‘national period’ to a ‘new period of labour internationalism’ (Munck 2002: 154), the 
capacity of these unions to appeal to international organisations and movements was 
based on their ‘associational power’ (Wright 2000: 962) at the plant level. It also once 
again supports the credibility thesis in their rejection of form-function relation, in that 
apparently similar institutional form has been observed to result in very different 
trajectories of institutional change. 
5. Conclusion 
The findings of this paper shows the scope of the credibility thesis in moving debates on 
LMIs beyond the fixation on form-function relations, and opens the possibility for 
institutional change to be interpreted as reflecting the intensification of conflict and 
contestation over prevailing institutional arrangements. Given the antagonistic nature of 
social relations of production, the stability of institutional forms may not necessarily 
signal lack of conflicts in labour relations. But the observation that formal institutional 
change accompanied heightening of industrial conflicts in all but one production units 
in this study is consistent with the link between institutional credibility and conflict 
postulated.  
In addition to conflict over LMIs, the majority of cases in which changes to the form of 
LMIs were observed experienced relocation of production from traditional industrial 
centres to sites with limited history of industrial labour movements. From the 
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perspective that forms of LMIs are tied up with other political and juridical institutions, 
it is perhaps not surprising that shifting production to a location with a very different 
social structure triggers changes to institutional forms. Moreover, it is significant that, 
while relocation was associated with de-unionisation in some cases (MT5/GT1 and 
KM10/NM4), in others unionisation was maintained (MM6/MM10 and 
MM5/MM8/MM9) or reorganised (KM5/MM3/GM1). In the latter case, even in the 
period without unions, the plant had a ‘workers’ committee’ to mediate labour-
management relations. These observations highlight the continued importance of LMIs 
even in regions where workforce has historically not been unionised. This is significant 
in the context of policy propositions in favour of non-unionised ‘flexible’ labour 
regimes in India. 
The observation that LMIs have been less diverse and more stable in Kolkata than in 
Mumbai goes against presumption made in some theoretical models (Banerji, Campos 
and Sabot 1995; Pencavel 1995) as well as policy propositions in India (GoI 2002), 
which associate party-political forms of LMIs with labour militancy and unstable 
industrial relations. Indeed, Kolkata has generally been associated with declining 
industrial disputes in general, and strikes in particular (Shyam Sundar 2004). It is 
possible that party-affiliated unions strengthens the ability of the state to mediate and 
‘restrain’ labour militancy (Teitelbaum 2011). For the credibility thesis, the observation 
once again renders theoretical postulation of form-function relations redundant, and 
confirms the importance of socio-historical contexts. For example, the process involved 
in workers at MM4 seeking affiliation to political parties in their attempts to strengthen 
the bargaining power of their unions and to direct unions to focus their negotiations on 
particular issues of concern, is very different to that in the Kolkata jute textile industry, 
where the dominance of party-affiliated unions has limited alternative forms of LMIs to 
emerge. Also, that political regime change from CPI(M) to TMC in 2011 resulted in 
reinforcement of party-union nexus in Kolkata, despite their difference in ideological 
orientations, can be taken as further caution against form-function links presumed by 
political ideology or conviction. One of the implications of these findings is that on-
going policy debates on labour market reforms in India focusing on exogenous policy 
engineering of LMIs may be misplaced. Engineering institutional changes exogenously 
based on predetermined ideological convictions may not necessarily result in LMIs 
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performing in the desired manner to bring about industrial ‘harmony’ or to deliver 
improvements in livelihoods. 
The findings of this paper also reveal that functions of LMIs can depend on whose 
perspective they are to be evaluated. On the one hand, the resilience of LMIs may imply 
stable conditions for production to continue and employment to be maintained for 
incumbent managers and workers in the formal sector establishments in Kolkata, but 
may not necessarily be ‘developmental’, either in the sense of dynamic capitalist 
development or labouring class struggles (Lerche 2010; Selwyn 2014; Pattenden 2016). 
On the other hand, the diverse and fluid LMIs in Mumbai may have reflected the 
capacity of both capital and labour to contest prevailing institutional arrangements, 
although this has eventually accompanied de-industrialisation and significant loss of 
employment in the city. Industrial relocation has in some cases led to ‘development’ 
either in technological upgrading and strengthening of labouring class mobilisation 
beyond the shop floor level, but in diverse and uneven ways, which once gain points to 
the importance of historically- and socially-sensitive analysis. These are question that 
conventional analysis focusing on institutional forms does not ask. The credibility thesis 
extended to LMIs in this paper offers a first step to addressing these issues. 
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 Table 1. ‘Stratas’ and the number of units surveyed 
  Regions 
  Kolkata 
Mumbai/ 
Maharashtra 
Gujarat 
NCR/ north 
India 
Sectors 
Traditional 
Jute textile 
manufacturing  
(n01 = n14 = 4) 
Cotton textile 
manufacturing 
(n01 = 5; n14 = 1) 
Cotton textile 
manufacturing 
(n14 = 1) 
n/a 
Modern 
Light 
engineering, 
processing, 
pharma etc. 
(n01 = 9; n14 = 4) 
Light engineering, 
processing, 
pharma etc. 
(n01 = 10; n14 = 5) 
Light 
engineering 
(n14 = 1) 
Light 
engineering, etc 
(n01 = 2; n14 = 4) 
Note: n01 denotes the number of units for which data is available in 2001; while n14 is the number of units 
for which data is available from the 2013-14 fieldwork. The total number of observation used in the 
analysis of this paper is 50 (based on 35 units, of which for 15 units, data from both 2001 and 2013-14 
fieldwork periods were used).  
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Figure 1. Map of India and fieldwork locations 
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Table 2 Variables used for the multidimensional scaling (MDS) of LMIs 
Variable names Definition Sum Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
UNION (i) Dummy variable on unionisation. 
1 if unionised; 0 if otherwise. 
42 0.82 0.385 
CENTRAL Dummy variable on the level of 
collective bargaining. 1 if 
centralised bargaining takes place; 
0 if otherwise. 
13 0.26 0.443 
PLANT Dummy variable on the level of 
collective bargaining. 1 if 
bargaining takes place at plant-
level; 0 if otherwise. 
36 0.72 0.454 
POLITICAL (ii) Dummy variable. 1 if there is a 
union affiliated to a political party; 
0 if otherwise. 
30 0.60 0.495 
INTERNAL Dummy variable. 1 if the union 
leadership is internal to the unit; 0 
otherwise. 
26 0.52 0.505 
TRIPARTITE Dummy variable. 1 if tri-partite 
bargaining takes place; 0 
otherwise 
18 0.49 0.485 
PUBLIC Dummy variable: 1 if the 
establishment is in the public 
sector; 0 otherwise. 
5 0.30 0.303 
Notes: (i) The number of unions and the extent of unionisation are not taken into 
account, as both of the information are often contested and difficult to verify. (ii) The 
variable takes one if at least one of the unions present has official party political 
affiliation, regardless of the party and its political or ideological position.  
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Table 3 Pair-wise correlation between the retained dimensions and variables 
Variable name 
  
Dimension 1: Dimension 2: 
Centralisation of LMIs Internalisation of LMIs 
UNION 0.278 -0.839 
CENTRAL 0.933 0.090 
PLANT -0.224 -0.858 
POLITICAL 0.673 -0.555 
INTERNAL -0.485 -0.786 
TRIPARTITE 0.910 -0.139 
PUBLIC 0.564 0.000 
Note: Classical multidimensional scaling (binary dissimilarity measure) with n = 50, seven variables, and 
two retained dimensions. Mardia fit measure 1  = 0.7860 and measure 2 = 0.9643.  
Figure 2 MDS mapping of types of LMIs in surveyed units, 2001 to 2013-14 
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Table 4 Types of LMIs represented by each points on the MDS mapping 
 
Unionisation 
Centralised 
bargaining 
(either at 
industry 
or/and 
region) 
Plant-level 
bargaining 
Politically 
affiliated 
unions 
Internal 
union 
leadership 
Tripartite 
collective 
bargaining 
Ownership 
of unit 
A Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Private 
B Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Private 
C Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Public 
D Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Public 
E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Public 
F Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Private 
G Yes No Yes No No No Private 
H Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Private 
I Yes No Yes No No No Private 
J Yes No Yes No Yes No Private 
K No No No No No No Private 
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Table 5 Changes to institutional forms and their trajectories in surveyed units 
  Institutional change prompted by: 
Trajectory of formal changes to 
LMIs: 
MT4 Breakdown of extra-unit bargaining A-D * → I  
MT5 →GT1 Breakdown of extra-unit bargaining/ relocation A-D * → F → K 
KM5/ MM3 → GM1 Relocation/ unionisation G → K → J 
KM6 Privatisation E → G  
KM10 → NM4 Relocation K → H → K 
MM4 Industrial disputes F → I → H 
MM5 → MM8/ MM9 Relocation J → J / H  
MM6 → MM10 Relocation I → J  
NM1 Unionisation K → H   
NM2 Unionisation K → J   
Note: * A-D indicates the ‘cluster’ in Figure 2 representing forms of LMIs in the ‘traditional’ sector; for 
legend of institutional forms, see Table 4.  
 
 
